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Permanent Link to Spoofing Detection and Mitigation with a Moving Handheld Receiver
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By John Nielsen, Ali Broumandan, and Gérard Lachapelle Ubiquitous adoption of and reliance upon GPS makes national and commercial infrastructures increasingly vulnerable to attack by criminals, terrorists, or hackers. Some GNSS signals such as GPS P(Y) and M-code, GLONASS P-code, and Galileo's Public Regulated Service have been encrypted to deny unauthorized access; however, the security threat of corruption of civilian GNSS signals increases constantly and remains an unsolved problem. We present here an efficient approach for the detection and mitigation of spoofed GNSS signals, as a proposed countermeasure to add to the existing system. Current methods to protect GPS civilian receivers from spoofing signals are based on the cross-check with available internal/external information such as predictable characteristics of the navigation data bits or correlation with ancillary inertial-based sensors; alternately, a joint process of signals received at two separate locations based on processing the P(Y)-code. The authentic GNSS signal sourced from a satellite space vehicle (SV) is very weak at the receiver's location and is therefore vulnerable to hostile jamming based on narrowband noise radiation at a modest power level. As the GNSS frequency band is known to the jammer, the effectiveness of the latter is easily optimized by confining radiation to within the GNSS signal band. The jammed GNSS receiver is denied position or time estimates which can be critical to the mission. While noise jamming of the GNSS receiver is a threat, the user is easily aware of its existence and characteristics. The worst case is that GNSS-based navigation is denied. A more significant jamming threat currently emerging is that of the spoofing jammer where bogus signals are transmitted from the jammer that emulate authentic GNSS signals. This is done with multiple SV signals in a coordinated fashion to synthesize a plausible navigation solution to the GNSS receiver. There are several means of detecting such spoofing jammers, such as amplitude discrimination, time-of-arrival discrimination, consistency of navigation inertial measurement unit (IMU) cross-check, polarization discrimination, angle-of-arrival (AOA) discrimination, and cryptographic authentication. Among these authentication approaches, the AOA discriminator and spatial processing have been

addressed and utilized widely to recognize and mitigate hostile attacks. We focus here on the antenna-array processing problem in the context of spoofing detection, with considerations to the pros and cons of the AOA discriminator for handheld GNSS receivers. An exploitable weakness of the spoofing jammer is that for practical deployment reasons, the spoofing signals generally come from a common transmitter source. Hence, a single jamming antenna sources the spoofing signals simultaneously. This results in a means of possible discrimination between the real and bogus GNSS signals, as the authentic GNSS signals will emanate from known bearings distributed across the hemisphere. Furthermore, the bearing of the jammer as seen from the GNSS receiver will be different than the bearing to any of the tracked GNSS satellites or space vehicles (SV). This immediately sets up some opportunities for the receiver to reject the spoofing jamming signals. Processing can be built into the receiver that estimates the bearing of each SV signal. Note that the relative bearings of the GNSS signals are sufficient in this case, as the bogus signals will all have a common bearing while the authentic GNSS signals will always be at different bearings. If the receiver comprises multiple antennas that have an unobstructed line of sight (LOS) to the SVs, then there are possibilities of spoofing detection based on the common bearing of the received GNSS signals and eliminating all the jammer signals simultaneously by appropriate combining of the receiver antennas to form a pattern null coincident with the jammer bearing. Unfortunately, the AOA discrimination will not be an option if the jammer signal or authentic signals are subjected to spatial multipath fading. In this case, the jammer and individual SV signals will come in from several random bearings simultaneously. Furthermore, if the GNSS receiver is constrained by the form factor of a small handset device, an antenna array will not be an option. As the carrier wavelength of GNSS signals is on the order of 20 to 25 centimeters, at most two antennas can be considered for the handset receiver, which can be viewed as an interferometer with some ability of relative signal-bearing estimation as well as nulling at specific bearings. However, such an antenna pair is not well represented by independent isotropic field sampling nodes, but will be significantly coupled and strongly influenced by the arbitrary orientation that the user imposes. Hence, the handset antenna is poorly suited for discrimination of the spoofing signal based on bearing. Furthermore, handheld receivers are typically used in areas of multipath or foliage attenuation, and therefore the SV signal bearing is random with significant variations. As we discuss here, effective spoofing detection is still possible for a single antenna GNSS receiver based on the differing spatial correlation of the spoofing and authentic signals in the proximity of the receiver antenna. The basic assumption is that the antenna will be spatially moved while collecting GNSS signal snapshots. Hence, the moving antenna generates a signal snapshot output similar to that of a synthetic array (SA), which, under some additional constraints, can provide an effective means of detecting the source of the GNSS signals from a spoofing jammer or from an authentic set of SVs. We assume here an arbitrary antenna trajectory with the spoofing and authentic signals subjected to random spatial multipath fading. The processing will be based on exploiting the difference in the spatial correlation of the spoofing and the authentic signals. Spoofing Detection Principle Consider a GNSS handset receiver (Figure 1) consisting of a single antenna that is spatially translated in time along an arbitrary trajectory as the signal is processed by the GNSS receiver. There are L authentic

GNSS SV signals visible to the receiver, along with a jammer source that transmits spoofing replicas of the same Lauthentic signals. FIGURE 1. GNSS receiver with a single antenna and 2L parallel despreading channels simultaneously providing channel gain estimates of L authentic and L spoofing signals as the antenna is moved along an arbitrary spatial trajectory. It is assumed that the number of spoofed signals range from 1 to L, which are coordinated such that they correspond to a realistic navigation solution at the output of the receiver processing. The code delay and Doppler associated with the spoofing signals will typically be different than those of the authentic signal. The basic technique of coordinated spoofing jamming is to present the receiver with a set of L signals that appear to be sufficiently authentic such that the spoofing and authentic signal sets are indistinguishable. Then the spoofing signals separate slowly in terms of code delay and Doppler such that the navigation solution corresponding to the L spoofing signals will pull away from the authentic navigation solution. The focus herein is on methods where the authenticity of the L tracked GNSS signals can be tested directly by the standalone receiver and then selected for the navigation processing. This is in contrast with other methods where the received signals are transmitted back to a communication command center for verification of authenticity. The consideration here is on the binary detection problem of assessing if each of the 2L potential signals is authenti c or generated by a spoofing source. This decision is based on observations of the potential 2L GNSS signals as the antenna is spatially moved through the trajectory. The complex baseband signal at the output of the antenna, denoted by $r(t)$, can be expressed as where i is the GNSS signal index, the superscripts A and J indicate authentic and jamming signals respectively, $p(t)$ shows the physical position vector of the moving antenna phase center relative to a stationary spatial coordinate system, $\Lambda^A_i(p(t),t)$ and $\Lambda^J_i(p(t),t)$ give the channel gain for the authentic and the spoofing signals of the ith SV at time t and position p, $c_i(t)$ is the PN coding modulation of ith GNSS signal, π^A_i and π^J_i are the code delay of ith PN sequence corresponding to the authentic and the spoofing sources respectively, f_{Di}^A and f_{Di}^J are the Doppler frequency of the ith authentic and the spoofing signals and $w(t)$ represents the complex baseband of additive noise of receiver antenna. For convenience, it is assumed that the signal index $i \varepsilon [1, 2, \ldots, L]$ is the same for the spoofing and authentic GNSS signals. The spoofer being aware of which signals are potentially visible to the receiver will transmit up to L different spoofing signals out of this set. Another simplification that is implied by Equation 1 is that the message coding has been ignored, which is justifiable as the GNSS signals are being tracked such that the message symbol modulation can be assumed to be removable by the receiver by some ancillary process that is not of interest in the present context. The objective of the receiver despreading operation is to isolate the channel gains $\Lambda^A(p(t),t)$ $\Lambda^J(p(t),t)$, which are raw observables used in the subsequent detection algorithm. It is assumed that the GNSS receiver is in a signal tracking state. Hence, it is assumed that the data coding, code phase of the spreading signal and Doppler are known inputs in the despreading operation. The two outcomes of the ith despreading channel for authentic and jamming signals are denoted as $r_i^A(t)$ and $r_k^J(t)$ respectively, as shown in Figure 1. This notation is used for convenience and not to imply that the receiver has knowledge of which of the pair of GNSS signals corresponds to the authentic or spoofer cases. The receiver processing will test each signal for authenticity to select the set of L signals that are passed to the navigation estimator. The despread signals riA(t) and rkJ(t) are collected over a snapshot interval of tε[0,T]. As the notation is simplified if discrete samples are considered, this interval is divided into M subintervals each of duration ΔT such that the mth subinterval extends over the interval of [(m−1)ΔT,mΔT]for mε[1,,2,…,M]. The collection of signal over the first and mth subintervals is illustrated in Figure 2. ΔT is considered to be sufficiently small such that ΛAi(p(t),t) or ΛJk(p(t),t) is approximately constant over this interval leading a set of M discrete samples for each despreading output. From this the vectors form of channel gain sample and outputs of despreaders can be defined by where ΛAi(p(mΔT),mΔT) and ΛJi(p(mΔT),mΔT) are the mth time sample of the ith despreader channel for the authentic and jamming GNSS signals. Figure 2. Spatial sampling of the antenna trajectory into M subinterval segments. Pairwise Correlation The central tenet of the spoofing detection is that the array gain vector denoted here as the array manifold vector for the jammer signals ΛJ will be the same for all of the L spoofing signals while the array manifold vector for the authentic signals ΛA will be different for each of the L authentic signals. If the random antenna trajectory is of sufficient length, then the authentic signal array manifold vectors will be uncorrelated. On the other hand, as the jammer signals emerge from the same source they will all have the same array manifold vector regardless of the random antenna trajectory and also regardless of the spatial fading condition. This would indicate that a method of detecting that a spoofer is present to form the Mx2L matrix of all of the despreader output vectors denoted as r and given as where it is assumed that M≥2L. Basically what can be assumed is that, if there is a spoofer from a common source that transmits more than one GNSS signal simultaneously, there will be some residual spatial correlation of the observables of ΛJi with other despreader outputs of the receiver. Therefore, if operations of pairwise correlations of all of the 2L despreader outputs result in high correlation, there is a likelihood of the existence of spoofing signals. These pairwise correlations can also be used to distinguish spoofing from authentic signals. Note that even during the time when the spoofing and authentic signals have the same Doppler and code offset, the superposition manifold vector of ΛAi and ΛJi will be correlated with other spoofing manifold vectors. The pairwise correlation of the various spoofing signals can be quantified based on the standard numerical estimate of the correlation coefficient given as where ri is the ith column vector of r defined in Equation 3, and the superscript H denotes the complex conjugate operator. Toward Spoofing Detection Figure 3 shows the spoofing attack detection and mitigation methodology: The receiver starts with the acquisition process of a given GNSS code. If, for each PN sequence, there is more than one strong peak above the acquisition threshold, the system goes to an alert state and declares a potential spoofing attack. Then the receiver starts parallel tracking on each individual signal. The outputs of the tracking pass to the discriminator to measure the correlation coefficient ρ among different PN sequences. As shown in Figure 3, if ρ is greater than a predefined threshold ϒ, the receiver goes to defensive mode. As the spoofer attempts to pull the tracking point off the authentic signals, the spoofer and authentic signals for a period of time will have approximately the same code offset and Doppler frequency. Hence, it may not be possib le to detect more than one peak in the acquisition mode. However, after a while the spoofer tries to pull tracking mode off. The outputs of the parallel tracking can be divided into two groups: the J group is the data set that is highly correlated, and the A group is the set that is uncorrelated. It is necessary that the receiver antenna trajectory be of sufficient length (a few tens of the carrier wavelengths) such that M is moderately large to provide a reasonable estimate of the pairwise correlation. The A group will be constrained in size based on the number of observable satellites. Usually this is known, and L can be set. The receiver has control over this by setting the bank of despreaders. If an SV signal is known to be unobtainable due to its position in the sky, it is eliminated by the receiver. Hence the A group can be assumed to be constrained in size to L. There is the possibility that a spoofer will generate a signal that is clear, while the SV signal is obscured by shadowing obstacles. Hence a spoofing signal can inadvertently be placed in the A group. However, as this signal will be correlated with other signals in the J group, it can be transferred from the A to the J group. When the spoofing navigation solution pulls sufficiently away from the authentic solution, then the navigation solution can create two solutions, one corresponding to the authentic signals and the other corresponding to the spoofing signals. At this stage, the despreading code delay and Doppler will change such that the authentic and spoofing signals (corresponding to the same GNSS signal) will appear to be orthogonal to each other. Proper placement of the members in the J and A groups can be reassessed as the set of members in the A group should provide the minimum navigation solution variance. Hence, in general there will be a spoofing and authentic signal that corresponds to the GNSS signal of index i. If the spoofing signal in group J appears to have marginal correlation with its peer in group A and, when interchanged with its corresponding signal in group A, the latter generates a lower solution variance, then the exchange is confirmed. Figure 3. Spoofing detection and mitigation methodology. Experimental Measurements We used two data collection scenarios in experiments of spoofing detection, based on utilizing a single antenna that is spatially translated, to demonstrate the practicality of spoofing-signal detection based on spatial signal correlation discrimination. In the first scenario, the spoofing measurements were conducted inside a modern three-story commercial building. The spoofing signals were generated by a hardware simulator (HWS) and radiated for a few minutes indoors, using a directional antenna pointing downward to affect only a small area of the building. The intention was to generate NLOS propagation conditions with significant multipath. The second data collection scenario was based on measuring authentic GPS L1 C/A signals under open-sky conditions, in which case the authentic GPS signals are temporally highly correlated. At the particular instance of the spoofing and the authentic GPS signal measurement scenarios, the SVs were distributed as shown in Figure 4. The GPS receiver in both scenarios consisted of an active patch right-hand circular polarized (RHCP) antenna and a down-conversion channelizer receiver that sampled the raw complex baseband signal. The total data record was subsequently processed and consisted in acquiring the correlation peaks based on 20-millisecond coherent integration of the spoofing signals and in extracting the channel gains L as a function of time. Figure 4. Skyplots of available satellites: a) spoofing signals from Spirent generator, b) authentic signals from rooftop antenna. Figure 5 shows a plot of the samples of the magnitude of despreader outputs for the various SV signals generated by the spoofing jammer and authentic signals. The signal magnitudes in the spoofing case are obviously highly correlated as expected, since the jammer signals are all emanating from a common antenna. Also, the SNRs are moderately high such that the decorrelation due to the channel noise is not significant. The pairwise correlation coefficient using Equation 4 are calculated for the measurement results represented in Figure 5 and tabulated in Table 1 and Table 2 for the spoofing and the authentic cases respectively. As evident, and expected, the correlations for the spoofing case are all very high. This is anticipated, as the spoofing signals all occupy the same frequency band with exception of small incidental shifts due to SV Doppler. Figure 5. Normalized amplitude value of the signal amplitude for different PRNs: a) generated from the same antenna, b) Authentic GPS signals. TABLE 1. Correlation coefficient deter- mined for the set of spoofing signals. TABLE 2. Correlation coefficient deter- mined for the set of authentic signals. Conclusions Spoofing signals generated from a common source can be effectively detected using a synthetic array antenna. The key differentiating attribute exploited is that the spoofing signals emanating from a single source are spatially correlated while the authentic signals are not. The method works regardless of the severity of multipath that the spoofing or authentic signals may be subjected to. The receiver antenna trajectory can be random and does not have to be jointly estimated as part of the overall spoofing detection. A patent is pending on this work. Manufacturers The experimental set-up used a Spirent GSS7700 simulator, National Instruments receiver (NI PXI-5600 down converter, and NI PXI-5142 digitizer modules), TECOM directional helical antennas as the transmitter antenna, and NovAtel GPS-701-GG as the receiver antenna. JOHN NIELSEN is an associate professor at the University of Calgary. ALI BROUMANDAN is a senior research associate in the Position Location And Navigation (PLAN) group at the University of Calgary. He obtained a Ph.D. in Geomatics Engineering from the University of Calgary in 2009. GERARD LACHAPELLE holds an iCORE/CRC Chair in Wireless Location and heads the PLAN Group in the Department of Geomatics Engineering at the University of Calgary.

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Milwaukee 48-59-2401 12vdc lithium ion battery charger used,ibm pa-1121-07ii ac adapter 16vdc 7.5a 4pin female power supply,this project uses a pir sensor and an ldr for efficient use of the lighting system,au41-160a-025 ac adapter 16vac 250ma used ~(~) 2.5x5.5mm switch,ancon 411503oo3ct ac adapter 15vdc 300ma used -(+) rf antenna co,ideation industrial be-090-15 switching adapter 29.5vdc 1.5a cha.lenovo 41r4538 ultraslim ac adapter 20vdc 4.5a used 3pin ite.a sleek design and conformed fit allows for custom team designs to.this break can be as a result of weak signals due to proximity to the bts,here a single phase pwm inverter is proposed using 8051 microcontrollers.delta adp-90cd db ac adapter 19vdc 4.74a used -(+)- 2x5.5x11mm,we hope this list of electrical mini project ideas is more helpful for many engineering students,the third one shows the 5-12 variable voltage,with an effective jamming radius of approximately 10 meters.sunfone acu034a-0512 ac adapter 12vc 5v 2a used 3 pin mini din a.bothhand sa06-20s48-v ac adapter +48vdc 0.4a power supply.cp18549 pp014s ac adapter 18.5vdc 4.9a used -(+)- 1 x5x7.5mm,reverse polarity protection is fitted as standard,sony vgp-ac19v35 ac adapter 19.5v dc 4.7a laptop power supply,chi ch-1234 ac adapter 12v dc 3.33a used -(+)- 2.5x5.5mm 100-240.st-c-070-19000342ct replacement ac adapter 19v dc 3.42a acer lap,clean probes were used and the time and voltage divisions were properly set to ensure the required output signal was visible.deer ad1505c ac adapter 5vdc 2.4a ac adapter plugin power supply.this circuit shows a simple on and off switch using the ne555 timer,pdf portable mobile cell phone signal jammer,developed for use by the military and law enforcement.cui ka12d120045034u ac adapter 12vdc 450ma used -(+)- 2x5.5x10mm.symbol stb4278 used multi-interface charging cradle 6vdc 0660ma.ibm 2684292 ac adapter 15v dc 2.7a used 3x5.5x9.3mm straight,we only describe it as command code here.motorola r35036060-a1 spn5073a ac adapter used 3.6vdc 600ma,it employs a closed-loop control technique,dell sadp-220db b ac adapter 12vdc 18a 220w 6pin molex delta ele.building material and construction methods,the source ak00g-0500100uu 5816516 ac adapter 5vdc 1a used ite,braun 5 497 ac adapter dc 12v 0.4a class 2 power supply charger,boss psa-120t ac adapter 9.6vdc 200ma +(-) 2x5.5mm used 120vac p,chd dpx411409 ac adapter 4.5vdc 600ma class 2 transformer,ksah2400200t1m2 ac adapter 24vdc 2a used -(+) 2.5x5.5mm round ba,replacement pa-1700-02 ac adapter 20v 4.5a power supply.air rage wlb-33811-33211-50527 battery quick charger,liteon pa-1600-2-rohs ac adapter 12vdc 5a used -(+) 2.5x5.5x9.7m.

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Neuling mw1p045fv reverse voltage ac converter foriegn 45w 230v.the components of this system are extremely accurately calibrated so that it is principally possible to exclude individual channels from jamming,matewell 41-18-300 ac adapter 18vdc 300ma used -(+) 1x3.4x9.9mm,surecall's fusion2go max is the cell phone signal booster for you.law-courts and banks or government and military areas where usually a high level of cellular base station signals is emitted,apx technologies ap3927 ac adapter 13.5vdc 1.3a used -(+)- 2x5.5,41-9-450d ac adapter 12vdc 500ma used -(+) 2x5.5x10mm round barr,the pki 6085 needs a 9v block battery or an external adapter,cui inc epa-201d-12 ac adapter 12vdc 1.66a used 8 pin mini din c.eng 3a-161wp05 ac adapter 5vdc 2.6a -(+) 2.5x5.5mm 100vac switch.st-c-075-18500380ct ac adapter 18.5vdc 2.7a 3.5a 3.8a used 1.6x4,replacement dc359a ac adapter 18.5v 3.5a used 2.3x5.5x10.1mm.cui inc epas-101w-05 ac adapter 5vdc 2a (+)- 0.5x2.3mm 100-240va.briefs and team apparel with our online design studio.ibm 73p4502 ac adapter 16vdc 0 - 4.55a 72w laptop power supply,this sets the time for which the load is to be switched on/off,tpt jsp033100uu ac adapter 3.3vdc 1a 3.3w used 3x5.5mm round bar.this circuit uses a smoke detector and an lm358 comparator.aps a3-50s12r-v ac adapter 15vdc 3.3a used 4 pin xlr female 100-.lien chang lcap07f ac adapter 12vdc 3a used -(+) 2.1x5.5mm strai.cobra ca 25 ac adapter dc 16v 100ma power supply charger.mastercraft 5104-18-2(uc) 23v 600ma power supply,liteon pa-1400-02 ac adapter 12vdc 3.33a laptop power supply,90 %)software update via internet for new types (optionally available)this jammer is designed for the use in situations where it is necessary to inspect a parked car,3500g size：385 x 135 x 50mm warranty：one year,sima sup-60 universal power adapter 9.5v 1.5a for camcorder,long-gun registry on the chopping block,traders with mobile phone jammer prices for buying.for technical specification of each of the devices the pki 6140 and pki 6200,car charger 12vdc 550ma used plug in transformer power supply 90.spec lin sw1201500-w01 ac adapter 12vdc 1.5a shield wire new.pentax battery charger d-bc7 for optio 555's pentax d-li7 lithiu,delta adp-90sb bd ac adapter 20vdc 4.5a used -(+)- 2.5x5.5x11mm,remember that there are three main important circuits.audiovox cnr-9100 ac adapter 5vdc 750ma power supply.baknor 41a-12-600 ac adapter 12vac 600ma used 2x5.5x9mm round ba.hp c5160-80000 ac adapter 12v dc 1.6a adp-19ab scanjet 5s scanne,hp ppp0016h ac adapter 18.5v dc 6.5a 120w used 2.5x5.5x12.7mm.925 to 965 mhztx frequency dcs,sony ac-lm5a ac dc adapter 4.2vdc 1.5a used camera camcorder cha,i mean you can jam all the wifi near by you.energizer accu chm4fc rechargeable universal charger like new 2..

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As overload may damage the transformer it is necessary to protect the transformer from an overload condition.tongxiang yongda yz-120v-13w ac adapter 120vac 0.28a fluorescent,you may write your comments and new project ideas also by visiting our contact us page,.
Email:e8UkH_8sZWOegv@aol.com
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Panasonic cf-aa1623a ac adapter 16vdc 2.5a used -(+) 2.5x5.5mm 9,dell pa-3 ac adapter 19vdc 2.4a 2.5x5.5mm -(+) power supply,component telephone u070050d ac adapter 7vdc 500ma used -(+) 1x3,.
Email:DWK2i_ADkVR9t@aol.com
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Delta eadp-10cb a ac adapter 5v 2a power supply printer hp photo,it could be due to fading along the wireless channel and it could be due to high interference which creates a dead- zone in such a region,milwaukee 48-59-1808 rapid 18v battery charger used genuine m12,bestec ea0061waa ac adapter +12vdc 0.5a 6w used 2 x 5 x 10mm,lei nu30-4120250-i3 ac adapter 12vdc 2.5a used 2x5.5mm 30w motor,nexxtech 2200502 ac adapter 13.5vdc 1000ma used -(+) ite power s,cui dsa-0151a-06a ac adapter +6vdc 2a used -(+) 2x5.5mm ite powe,nokia ac-3n ac adapter cell phone charger 5.0v 350ma asian versi..
Email:30P_Uvi7mmX9@aol.com
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This exception includes all laser jammers.hp compaq 384020-001 ac dc adapter 19v 4.74a laptop power supply,and here are the best laser jammers we’ve tested on the road,ault symbol sw107ka0552f01 ac adapter 5vdc 2a power supply,finecom wh-501e2c low voltage 12vac 50w 3pin hole used wang tran,insignia ns-pltpsp battery box charger 6vdc 4aaa dc jack 5v 500m.makita dc9800 fast charger 7.2v dc9.6v 1.5a used 115~ 35w..
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Direct plug-in sa48-18a ac adapter 9vdc 1000ma power supply,fone gear 01023 ac adapter 5vdc 400ma used 1.1 x 2.5 x 9mm strai.curtis dv-04550s 4.5vdc 500ma used -(+) 0.9x3.4mm straight round.sima spm-3camcorder battery charger with adapter.canon cb-2lwe ac adapter 8.4vdc 0.55a used battery charger,this paper shows the real-time data acquisition of industrial data using scada,this project uses an avr microcontroller for controlling the appliances..